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"people without history." The eighty pages of endnotes and thirty-five-page 
bibliography are gold mines of references to ancient literary sources and modern 
scholarship, and there are only a few {mostly German} omissions. Dossey 
advances our understanding of the agricultural society of Christian North Africa 
and has made a major contribution to the study of this important facet of the 
later Roman Empire and the Vandals. 
University of Southern Denmark Jesper Carlsen 
Taliban: The Unknown Enemy. By James Fergusson. (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo 
Press, 2010. Pp. 416. $27.95.) 
As the war in Afghanistan enters its eleventh year, the most optimistic description 
of the conflict is probably calling it a stalemate, which actually represents a defeat 
for the counterinsurgent forces (i.e., the United States and NATO). A more 
realistic description of the war in Afghanistan is that it has become a $440 billion 
quagmire. According to the Los Angeles Times, the most recent National Intelli-
gence Estimate on the war produced by the United States intelligence community, 
which often represents the least negative interpretation and the one on which all 
participating agencies can agree, paints a "gloomy picture" and suggests the war 
has become a "grim situation." 
James Fergusson, a British journalist who has covered Afghanistan, suggests in 
his book Taliban: The Unknown Enemy that the war has become a mess primarily 
because the West has a basic misunderstanding of the nature of the Taliban. 
Although the West still looks at the Taliban as a bunch of black-turbaned, 
bearded, draconian fanatics toting Kalashnikovs and the Qur'an, according to 
Fergusson the Taliban are not really that bad, just misunderstood. T he Taliban, 
according to Fergusson, basically represent a Pashtun "tribal" movement that 
reflects dominant ideas that are firmly rooted in Afghanistan's cultural, religious, 
and historical experience. He writes that the Taliban's "conservatism [differs] 
from the rest of the country not in kind, but in degree" {89). But the most central 
thesis that Fergusson presents is that the key to peace in Afghanistan must be 
negotiations (peace talks, reconciliation, reintegration} with the Taliban to affect 
a negotiated {political) settlement that incorporates the Taliban into the Afghan 
government. 
The Taliban "insurgency" is actually a jihad or at least an insurgency 
wrapped in the narrative of jihad. Jihads have been a mainstay of Afghanistan's 
history and represent a religious obligation that Afghans take extremely 
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seriously. Importantly, no jihad in the history of mankind has ever ended with a 
negotiated settlement. There is not going to be anything resembling meaningful 
negotiations until all foreign soldiers have left Afghanistan. Mullah Omar, the 
Amir ul' Momineen (Leader of the Faithful), has made that perfectly clear, which 
Fergusson acknowledges (367). Mullah Omar has stated unequivocally that 
anyone engaging in talks with the Lnfidel government in Kabul will be liquidated. 
The 2010 purge of so-called "moderates" by the Querta Shura and Pakistan's 
Inter-Services Intelligence Department (ISI) makes enforcement of this iron-
clad-as Stalin's purge did in the 1930s. The Taliban leadership that matter-the 
Querta Shura- are not going to negotiate with the orders of Allah any more 
than a Catholic priest can negotiate getting married with the pope. Meaningful 
peace talks with the real leaders of the Taliban are not going to happen. And the 
corollary myth that significant numbers of the enemy are going to switch from 
a perceived winning side to a perceived losing side via "reconciliation"- so they 
can either be shot now or hung from lampposts in a few years-is too silly to 
take seriously. Hence, though there is much to admire about Fergusson's book, 
its major fault is his misinterpretation of what the real and important Taliban 
leadership represent-the very charge that he makes against Western politicians 
and diplomats. 
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Imagining the Middle East: The Building of an American Foreign Policy, 1918-1967. 
By Matthew F. Jacobs. (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2011. 
Pp. xiii, 318. $39.95.) 
In the aftermath of September 11, the quest to understand the Middle East has 
become an American "national obsession," in which experts and pundits alike are 
trying to make sense of a region and its people, whose history, character, and 
religion have long been viewed as the mysterious other. Matthew F. Jacobs argues 
that the discursive "contours" of our debate today evolved between the end of 
World War I and the late 1960s, when an "informal transnational network of 
professional specialists" from academia, the business world, government, and the 
media tried to "imagine" and interpret the complexities of the Middle East to 
American audiences (239, 6). Drawing heavily on the language of postmodernism, 
Jacobs attempts to "understand the intellectual environment within which debates 
about the nature and direction of U.S.-Middle East relations took place" (10). 
